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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIE E. SIMS, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 900324 
v, : 
COLLECTION DIVISION OF THE : Category No. 15 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the final decision of the Utah 
State Tax Commission. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(e)(ii) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue properly before the Court for review is 
whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies in a drug 
stamp tax proceeding before the Utah State Tax Commission. 
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction 
of error" standard of review applies. City of Monticello v. 
Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 
120 (1990); Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 76$ P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 
1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, Louie E. Sims, was served by the Utah State 
Tax Commission with a notice and demand for the payment of tax 
due as a result of petitioner's failure "to obtain the official 
stamps, labels or other indica [sic] required and defined by 
Title 59-19-103, known as Illegal Drug Stamp Act" (R. 257). 
Petitioner filed a petition for redetermination of the 
tax assessment, and a formal hearing before the Tax Commission 
was scheduled (R. 41-44, 132). After the hearing, the Tax 
Commission affirmed the tax assessment against petitioner (R. 8-
12) • 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A lengthy recitation of the facts underlying the 
seizure of controlled substances which led to the tax assessment 
against petitioner is not necessary to the resolution of the 
single issue this Court should address on appeal. The parties 
stipulated to the following pertinent facts: 
1. The tax was imposed as a result of a 
seizure of drugs from Sims' vehicle on 
or about July 27, 1988. 
2. The drugs were determined to be cocaine 
and mari j uana. 
3. There was no evidence that drug stamps 
had been attached to those substances. 
4. Sims did not purchase drug stamps. 
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5. The tax involved is an illegal drug 
stamp tax in the amount of $197,053 and 
penalty of $197,053 assessed on August 
30, 1988, by the State Tax Commission. 
(R. 144-45). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Tax Commission was correct in refusing to apply the 
exclusionary rule to an Illegal Drug Stamp Tax proceeding. The 
tax and penalty are civil. The administrative hearing before the 
Commission was a purely civil proceeding. 
Analysis of the history and development of the 
judicially created rule, in both federal and state courts, 
reveals that it has been primarily applied to criminal 
proceedings where its deterrent effect is likely to be served. 
When applied to civil matters, application has been limited to 
instances where the deterrence of unlawful conduct can be 
achieved. In this case, Tax Commission agents did not direct or 
participate in the seizure of the illegal drugs on which the tax 
is based. The Commission has no authority to affect the actions 
of law enforcement agencies. The rule should not be extended to 
this non-criminal administrative hearing, where there can be no 
deterrent effect on possible "unlawful conduct" of law 
enforcement agents. 
Petitioner's argument that the deterrence goal of the 
exclusionaryy rule would be fulfilled in light of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-16-105(6) (Supp. 1990) (tax proceeds sharing provision) is 
not applicable here. This statutory provision was not effective 
in 1988, when the taxes were assessed against the Petitioner. 
INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
Petitioner has raised eight issues on appeal. Seven of 
the eight issues relate to the legality of the roadblock at which 
he was stopped and the search of his vehicle conducted at that 
roadblock pursuant to his consent. Although these issuers were 
raised by petitioner below, the Tax Commission did not rule on 
them because it concluded that the exclusionary rule did not 
apply to civil tax proceedings. 
Given the Tax Commission's ruling regarding the 
exclusionary rule, this Court should address only the propriety 
of that ruling. If the Court were to conclude that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply in proceedings before the Tax 
Commission, the legality of the roadblock and the consent search 
would be irrelevant. On the other hand, if the Court were to 
reach a contrary conclusion, the matter should be remanded to the 
Tax Commission for a determination of the exclusion question. 
Such a procedure would be appropriate in light of the fact that 
the roadblock and consent search issues have been presented to 
the Utah Court of Appeals in a pending appeal from petitioner's 
criminal conviction of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute. State v. Sims, No. 890463-CA. If the tax 
matter were remanded to the Commission by this Court, the 
Commission would in all likelihood have the benefit of the court 
of appeals' decision on the search and seizure issues. 
In sum, this Court should address only one of the eight 
issues raised by petitioner: Does the exclusionary rule apply in 
a drug stamp tax poceeding before the Tax Commission? Assuming 
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they become relevant, the search and seizure issues are better 
resolved in the appeal from petitioner's criminal conviction and 
in the first instance by the Tax Commission, The State will 
therefore limit its argument in this brief to the issue of the 
exclusionary rule's application. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TAX COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO 
APPLY THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO ILLEGAL DRUG 
STAMP TAX APPEAL PROCEEDINGS. 
A- The Administrative Hearing Before tne Commission 
Was a Civil Proceeding. 
Central to this issue is whether the penalties for 
violation of the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-
19-101 et seq. ("the Stamp Act") are civil or criminal. Rules of 
statutory construction and case law establish that the tax and 
penalty provisions of the Act are civil. The Act clearly implies 
separate civil and criminal penalties. 
A purely civil tax on illegal activities is common. 
For instance, gains from illegal transactions, such as 
bootlegging, gambling, extortion, or fraud are included in gross 
income under the Internal Revenue Code. The application of a 
tax on income from illegal sources does not change the civil 
See United State v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (gains from 
illegal gambling activities are taxable income); E.C. James, 366 
U.S. 213 (1961) (embezzled funds are to be included in gross 
income of the embezzler in the year in which the funds are 
embezzled); and G.D. Wood, 693 F.Supp. 452 (1988) (taxpayer was 
required to pay income taxes on income received from illegal drug 
activities even though all proceeds from illegal drug 
transactions were eventually forfeited to the government). 
nature of the taxing process- Likewise, a tax assessed upon an 
illegal substance does not convert the nature of the tax from 
civil to criminal. 
The Stamp Act clearly defines a tax and establishes a 
100% penalty on any of these unpaid taxes. This is a civil 
penalty which is assessed and collected as part of the tax. Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-19-106(1) (Supp. 1990). 
The subsection immediately following states: "In 
addition to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distributing or 
possessing marihuana or controlled substances without affixing 
the appropriate stamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of a 
third degree felony and is subject to a fine of not more than 
$10,000 . . . ." § 59-19-106(2) (emphasis added). If the 
legislature had intended the entire statute to impose either a 
civil or criminal penalty, it would not have distinguished 
between the two. Thus, the legislature clearly expressed a 
separate civil tax and penalty assessment. 
In United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980), the 
Supreme Court held that a penalty imposed on persons discharging 
hazardous substances into navigable waters was a civil penalty, 
stating that the question of whether a penalty is civil or 
criminal is a matter of statutory construction. The Court 
accepted the congressional label of "civil". It said: 
Our inquiry in this regard has traditionally 
proceeded on two levels. First, we have set 
out to determine whether Congress, in 
establishing the penalizing mechanism, 
indicated either expressly or impliedly a 
preference for one label or the other. 
Second, where Congress has indicated an 
intention to establish a civil penalty, we 
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have inquired further whether the statutory 
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or 
effect as to negate that intention. In 
regard to this latter inquiry, we have noted 
that "only the clearest proof could suffice 
to establish the unconstitutionality of a 
statute on such a ground.'1 
Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted). 
Further, the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act is not so 
punitive in nature as to negate the civil penalties- The Supreme 
Court in Ward, referring to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S, 
144 (1963), reaffirmed the seven factors, previously established, 
that have "prove[n] helpful in . . . consideration of similar 
questions . . . ." Ward, 448 U.S. at 249. These seven factors 
are: 
[ 1 ] Whether the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint, [2] 
whether it has historically been regarded as a 
punishment, [3] whether it comes into play 
only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment — retribution and deterrence, [5] 
whether the behavior to which it applies is 
already a crime, [6] whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be connected 
is assignable for* it, and [7] whether it 
appears excessive in relation to the inquiry, 
and may often point in differing directions. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-9 (emphasis in original, 
footnotes omitted). 
When these factors are applied, it is clear that the 
Stamp Act is civil in nature. The Supreme Court has declared 
that where both a civil and criminal penalty are found in the 
same statute, that fact dilutes the force of an argument that the 
civil penalty is really a criminal penalty. Ward 448 U.S. at 250 
(discussing Halverinq v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (a 50% 
penalty for tax fraud was held to be civil)). 
There is no case law in support of the proposition that 
payment of a stamp tax has historically been viewed as a form of 
criminal punishment. The traditional aims of criminal 
punishment, retribution and deterrence, are not served by the 
Stamp Act. The Act imposes statutorily fixed taxes and penalties 
on specific substances. See Utah Code Ann, § 59-19-103 (Supp. 
1990), These taxes are not affected by a criminal conviction. 
The behavior to which the penalty applies is a violation of the 
Stamp Act or, in other words, a failure to acquire and affix the 
required stamps. This behavior becomes a crime only when the 
felony and fine aspect of Utah Code Ann, § 59-19-106(2) (Supp. 
1990) is applied. The application of the felony and fine aspect 
is not within the jurisdiction of the Tax Commission. The tax is 
imposed upon a substance and is not related to a criminal 
conviction. 
The alternative purpose assigned to the civil penalty 
clearly is not excessive. The South Dakota Supreme Court was 
faced with a similar question in determining whether a $750.00 
civil penalty was excessive for possession of less than one ounce 
of marijuana. See State v. Barber, 427 N.W.2d 375 (S.D. 1988). 
That court reasoned: 
[W]e find that the civil penalty . . . [for 
possession of marijuana] is not so clearly 
excessive as to bear no relationship to the 
purpose for which it is imposed. Drug abuse 
is a peril to society and particularly to our 
youth. The costs to society in terms of the 
health and mental well-being and lost 
potential of young people involved in such 
activity are incapable of estimation. 
Further, in attempting to curb drug abuse, 
society is required to expend ever increasing 
financial resources in law enforcement and 
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drug awareness and prevention campaigns. The 
civil penalty . . . for possession of 
marijuana is of but little recompense to 
society for those costs. 
Id. at 377. 
For these reasons, the Court should conclude that the 
Act's civil penalties are not criminal in nature. Thus, the 
hearing before the Commission was a civil proceeding. 
B. The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply To A 
Civil Proceedingr And Its Application Would 
Be Incorrect In This Case, 
The relief sought by petitioner, namely application of 
the exclusionary rule to Commission proceedings, is inconsistent 
with the history and development of the rule on both the state 
and federal level. Its application in this case would not 
further the purpose of the rule. 
1. History and Development of the Exclusionary 
Rule in Federal and Utah Courts. 
Prior to the rule's creation, courts would not suppress 
pertinent evidence, even though illegally obtained. See Adams v. 
New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904). This changed when the 
exclusionary rule was announced in Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914). The Court reasoned that without this judicial 
protection the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures would become meaningless. _Id. at 393. 
However, because Weeks was not then binding on the 
states, the Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected its application 
to state court proceedings. State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 
704, 708 (1923); see also State v. Fair, 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P-2d 
615 (1960). The Utah Court reasoned that this constitutional 
right would be protected by subjecting the individual conducting 
the unreasonable search and seizure "to all consequences and 
penalties provided by law." Aime, 220 P. at 707. This rationale 
was directly contrary to the federal rule that was not directed 
at "individual misconduct" but at illegally obtained evidence. 
However, Utah's independence in this area came to an 
end when the Supreme Court announced that the exclusionary rule 
would be binding on state courts. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961). The basis of that decision was that the exclusionary 
rule would protect the "imperative of judicial integrity" by 
compelling the government to comply with the "charter of its own 
existence." Id., at 658-59 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206, 222 (I960)). In a later case, the Court made clear 
that "[j]udicial integrity clearly does not mean that the courts 
must never admit evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 
(1976) . 
The Utah Supreme Court was thus compelled to apply the 
rule it had expressly rejected in Aime. See State v. Jasso, 439 
P.2d 844 (Utah 1979) . 
The earlier rationale of "the imperative of judicial 
integrity," was later eclipsed by a policy of deterrence. In 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court specified 
that "[t]he primary justification for the exclusionary rule then 
is the deterrence of police conduct that violates Fourth 
Amendment Rights." Ld. at 486. The Court restricted application 
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of the rule "to those areas where its remedial objectives are 
thought most efficaciously served." ^d. at 487-88 (quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)); see also 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08, 918-19 (1984). 
In a corresponding footnote, the Court quoted a noted 
criminal law commentator: "[T]he rule is a needed, but 
grud[g]ingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be swallowed 
than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many 
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from 
blundering, pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the 
confines of necessity inflicts gratuitous harm on the public 
interest." Stone 428 U.S. at 487 n.24 (quoting Amsterdam, 
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa.L.Rev. 
378, 388-89 (1964)). 
Thus, the judiciary designed the exclusionary rule to 
deter future unlawful conduct of law enforcement officers. The 
rule is properly applied in instances where its deterrent purpose 
is likely to be served. 
2. Application of the Exclusionary Rule to 
Civil Matters in Federal Cases. 
In United States v. Janis, the Supreme Court was asked 
to apply the exclusionary rule to a tax proceeding. There, the 
police obtained a warrant to search Janis's residence for 
bookmaking paraphernalia. Id. at 434. Cash and wagering records 
were seized. A police officer informed the IRS of these records. 
Based on this information, Janis was assessed wagering taxes. 
Id. at 437. The IRS levied on Janis's cash that had been seized 
by the police. 
A subsequent state criminal action was brought, and the 
court suppressed the evidence seized by the police- The court 
ordered all items returned except the cash levied by the IRS. 
Id. at 437-38. Janis filed for a refund of the Ccish. After the 
IRS denied the request, Janis filed an action in federal district 
court which sought suppression of all evidence from which the 
assessment had been made. 
The Supreme Court held "that the judicially created 
exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the 
civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a 
criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign." JA. at 
459-60. The Court expressly stated: "In the complex and 
turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has applied it to 
exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state." Id. 
at 447 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). The Court expressly 
left open the question of the rule's application where 
2 
"intrasovereign" violations have taken place. Rl. at 456. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court weighed the 
"likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police . . . 
[against] the societal costs imposed by the exclusion . . . ." 
Id. at 454. The Court reasoned that "the deterrent effect of the 
exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the 
'punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement 
officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or 
The court stated: "[T]he seminal cases that apply the 
exclusionary rule to a civil proceeding involve "intrasovereign" 
violations, [] a situation we need not consider here." Janis, 
428 U.S. at 456 (footnote omitted). 
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against a different sovereign." Ld. at 458. The Court went on 
to state: 
This attenuation, coupled with the existing 
deterrence effected by the denial of use of 
the evidence by either sovereign in the 
criminal trials with which the searching 
officer is concerned, creates a situation in 
which the imposition of the exclusionary rule 
sought in this case is unlikely to provide 
significant, much less substantial additional 
deterrence. It falls outside the offending 
officer's zone of primary interest. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court decided that the societal costs imposed by 
the rule were too severe because "the enforcement of admittedly 
valid laws would be hampered by so extending the exclusionary 
rule, and, as is nearly always the case with the rule, the 
concededly relevant and reliable evidence would be rendered 
unavailable." .Id. at 447. 
In petitioner's case, county law enforcement officers 
brought a criminal action against Sims. As a result of the 
criminal charges arising out of the possession of the controlled 
substances, the district court ruled that the search of the 
petitioner's vehicle was lawful (R. at 9). These law enforcement 
officers were not under the control of the Commission, nor does 
the Commission have any authority to control their activities. 
The relationship of county law enforcement officers and Utah 
Highway Patrol officers to the Utah State Tax Commission is 
extremely attenuated. An application of the exclusionary rule to 
tax proceedings is unlikely to effect the deterrent purpose of 
the rule because tax law enforcement is well outside the 
arresting officers' zone of primary interest. 
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the 
Supreme Court addressed the issue it had expressly left open in 
Janis: whether the exclusionary rule applied in a civil case 
involving intrasovereign violations. There, Lopez-Mendoza 
challenged the deportation ordejr of an immigration judge because 
his alien status had come to the attention of officials of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) by illegal means. 
Id. at 1034. The Court found that a "deportation proceeding is a 
purely civil action . . . ," id. at 1038, although it "is a civil 
complement to a possible criminal prosecution . . . ." Id. at 
1042. The immigration judge could not "adjudicate guilt or 
punish . . . for any crime related to unlawful entry into or 
presence in this country. Consistent with the civil nature of 
the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of 
a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing." _Id. at 
1038. 
The Court, in applying the balancing test of Janis, 
concluded that exclusion would not deter the INS from Fourth 
Amendment violations because of a comprehensive scheme by the INS 
to prevent this type of conduct. 3x1. at 1046. On the other side 
of the equation, the Court found that the social cost was "both 
unusual and significant." Id.. It stated that ongoing violations 
of immigration law would occur, that the streamlined deportation 
hearing would become cumbersome, and that administration of the 
exclusionary rule by the Board of Immigration Appeals would 
become costly. Rl. at 1048-49. Thus, the Court found the 
exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil cases involving 
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intrasovereign violations where the balancing test of Janis is 
satisfied* 
The Second Circuit in Tirado v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 307 (2nd Cir. 1982), considered 
whether evidence allegedly seized unlawfully by federal narcotics 
officers for use in a criminal trial was also barred by the 
exclusionary rule in a subsequent federal tax proceeding- The 
court concluded that the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary 
rule is not served by applying the rule to exclude evidence from 
a proceeding where the evidence was not seized with the 
participation or collusion of, or in contemplation of use by, 
agents responsible for the proceeding in which the evidence is 
presented• The court held that the rule was inapplicable in the 
tax proceeeding. 
The Lopez-Mendoza and Tirado cases are substantially 
similar to this appeal. The tax proceedings conducted before an 
administrative body with limited jurisdiction are separate from 
possible criminal prosecutions held before a court with proper 
criminal jurisdiction. The Tax Commission cannot adjudicate 
guilt or impose criminal sanctions. Additionally, it cannot 
guide or direct the efforts of law enforcement personnel, nor can 
it correct any conduct by law enforcement personnel which may be 
violative of constitutional rights. The courts in the cases 
discussed above concluded that exclusion of evidence in these 
proceedings would not deter Fourth Amendment violations by the 
agency in its investigation of possible criminal activity. 
Petitioner's case is analogous. Application of the rule to tax 
proceedings would not achieve any deterrent effect. It would be 
inappropriate to apply criminal, protections to these purely civil 
tax proceedings. 
3. Application of the Exclusionary Rule by 
State Courts, 
This Court has never articulated a state exclusionary 
rule for civil administrative cases. It should not extend the 
exclusionary rule to administrative proceedings before the Tax 
Commission. 
Other state courts have rejected the application of the 
rule in civil proceedings. The Supreme Court of Virginia in 
County of Henrico v. Ehlers, 379 S.E.2d 457 (Va. 1989), held: 
"[T]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not be extended 
from criminal cases to civil cases." 3Jd. at 462. That court 
reasoned that deterrence is not served by the rule because no 
empirical proof exists as to its effectiveness. The court 
further rejected the rule because it renders reliable and 
probative evidence unavailable; it deflects the truth-finding 
process; and it risks engendering disrespect for law by promoting 
procedure above the fundamental search for truth and justice. 
Id. 
The Missouri Court of Appeals in Green v. Director of 
Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 818 (Mo.App. 1988), held that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply to civil proceedings for 
revocation of a driver's license. In that case the Director of 
Revenue conceded that the stop which resulted in Green's arrest 
for intoxication was unlawful. Green refused to take a chemical 
breath test, which refusal resulted in revocation of his driver's 
-16-
license. Green asserted that the exclusionary rule should apply 
on review of the revocation. The court characterized its review 
of revocation for failure to take the breath test as judicial 
review of an administrative decision, which is a civil 
proceeding, and "not subject to the rules of evidence in criminal 
cases." _Id. at 820, The court adopted the reasoning of an Iowa 
decision, which concluded that "the improbable deterrent effect 
of applying the rule in license revocation proceedings, when 
weighed against the loss of reliable and relevant proof . . . 
necessitated a finding that the exclusionary rule was 
inapplicable in the license revocation proceeding-" Id. at 820 
(citing Westendorf v. Iowa Dept of Transportation, 400 N.W.2d 
553, 557 (Iowa 1987)). The Westendorf court had refused to 
extend the use of the exclusionary rule formulated under the 
fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution to the use of evidence in an administrative action 
revoking a driver's license. Westendorf, 400 N.W.2d at 556. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Delguidice v. New 
Jersey Racing Commission, 100 N.J 79, 494 A.2d 1007 (1985), was 
called upon to determine whether the New Jersey Racing 
Commission, in a jockey licensing hearing, could consider 
evidence obtained by law enforcement officers through illegal 
means. The court determined that a finding of entrapment and 
resulting dismissal of criminal proceedings against a jockey did 
not prevent use of incriminating evidence in the jockey's 
licensing hearing before the Racing Commission. The court began 
with the proposition that "in an administrative hearing, unlike a 
criminal trial, all relevant evidence is admissible . . . . This 
difference is explained in part by the varying goaLs of the two 
proceedings: whereas the former is penal, the latter is 
regulatory," id. at 1009- The court utilized the reasoning and 
balancing test of Janis and Lopez-Mendoza and determined that 
"the deterrent effect of excluding evidence is highly attenuated 
when the entity forbidden from using the evidence is not the same 
entity whose agents engaged in the illegal maneuvers." 
Delquidice, 494 A.2d at 1011. The court pointed oat that the law 
enforcement agents had already been deterred from committing 
future acts of entrapment by reason of the dismissal of the 
criminal indictments, and "[t]hat result has to be of substantial 
concern to the police. Extending the exclusionary sanction to 
the subsequent licensing proceeding would have, at best, only a 
marginal deterrent effect." jEd. at 1101. 
Exclusion of evidence by the Commission would not deter 
county and other law enforcement agencies from Fourth Amendment 
violations. Their primary goal is arrest and prosecution for 
violation of criminal statutes. Application of the rule would 
have significant social costs. Barred evidence of drugs and drug 
sales that escape taxation leaves the community to bear the 
enormous burdens and costs of the social ills they cause. 
Administrative hearings before the Commission would become 
cumbersome. Additional costs, time requirements, and hearings 
would be required to resolve the issue of admissibility. Direct 
judicial review by this Court would be required whenever an 
alleged violation of the rule is appealed. Thus balancing of 
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interests clearly weighs in favor of not extending the 
exclusi on.ai:y i : i :i ] e t<: • adin i i i i s11:ati ve tax proceedings. 
c# utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105(6) (Supp. 1990) 
Which Provides For a Sharing of Tax 
Collection Revenues Became Effective 
April 2 4 , 1989, and Therefore Does Not 
Apply Here, 
Petitioner a.-or^? "hat in li^uu of UtcJi 'V^k- Ay* *• 59 • 
] 9- 105 (• ^nnn. " i
 Li .cation of the excl usif:i]<.;:\ - - • :< : 
this case wouU; indeed fulfil, the deterrence goal. Petitioner's 
Il:i ::i ef a ' . ^ . .- s unavailable here. 
Section V- : - r' , r"* provides that the Commission sha]1 
— collect <iJ 1 taxes due under the Act (whether characterized as 
revenues shall ultimately be distributed \ o the enforcement 
agency for use in the continued enforcement of controlled 
si ibstaii.ee laws . 
However, this sharing provision was added to § 59-19-
IW J D V the 1989 legislature. The amendment was not effective on 
July i\\ -;:.- • ' :\ seizure • : cocaine and marijuai la 
occurred. The taxes assessed became due and payable on August 
29, 1988. Subsection (6) of § 59-19-105 became effective on 
April ... • ^, many months after the assessment on the 
controlled substances was made. A statute has retroactive 
- -.-. • <- ' .•'<'•-• '-;.•-".••. 1 -.;.'. ;
 : :or. I at •« > t':< as retroacti ve by 
i.ne legislating. Utah COC.- A;U;. <-, <>8-i~.- ; 1^  ^ 6) states: "No 
part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly 
Any tax revenues resulting from the Stamp Act's 
imposition prior to April 24, 1989, were not shared with any 
enforcement agency pursuant to the statutory scheme. When the 
seizure and arrest were made in this case, there could have been 
no contemplation in the arresting officers' minds of any monetary 
benefit to the arresting agency or officer resulting from a 
possible tax assessment. The sharing provision did not exist at 
that time. The officers' primary zone of interest was strictly 
criminal, and did not include a potential civil tax assessment* 
Therefore, the "deterrence" rationale, upon which the 
exclusionary rule is based, would have no application to the 
officers here. Although this argument may arise in a future 
3 
case, it cannot be considered here. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
affirm the decision of the Tax Commission. 
Alternatively, if the Court decides that the 
exclusionary rule applies in a drug stamp tax proceeding before 
3 
In the event that this Court decides that the rule should be 
applied to a Tax Commission proceeding because of the deterrent 
effect on improper police conduct, it should modify the rule's 
effect. The rule acts as a prophylactic to deter future improper 
police conduct. See Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454. It punishes the 
offending agency. If all evidence is suppressed in the Tax 
Commission proceeding, that purpose will not be fulfilled. The 
Tax Commission, a non-offending agency, will also be punished in 
a draconian manner; the evidence supporting its case will 
disappear. 
-20-
the Commission, the case should be remanded to the Commission for 
t\ rit-»lj Tininat i MM ot the exclusion question-
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Corit The proper remedial measure would be to bar the 
offending agency from sharing in the proceeds. Hence, the 
prophylactic purpose of the rule would be sustained. The 
offending agency would be barred from reaping the benefits of its 
improper conduct. The non-offending agency, the Tax Commission, 
could then be allowed to proceed without the confines of the 
rule. This would satisfy the rule and be consistent with the 
mandates of the legislature contained within the Illegal Drug 
Stamp Act, specifying the distribution of proceeds: "If no law 
enforcement agency is involved in the collection of a specific 
amount under this chapter, the entire amount collected shall be 
applied under Subsection (6)(a)(i) to administrative costs of 
